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It is 25 years since the inception of Child and Family Law Quarterly and the Children 
Act 1989, with its guiding precept that ‘the welfare of the child’ shall be the court’s 
paramount consideration. During those 25 years, despite an increasing awareness by 
courts and professionals of the effects of domestic violence on children, and 
initiatives aimed at protecting the safety and welfare of children and resident parents 
from the risks posed by perpetrators of domestic violence, the numbers of contact 
applications refused by courts have steadily decreased to the point where they are 
negligible. 1  We have also seen varying attempts to circumscribe the ‘welfare 
principle’ – by feminist campaigners and academics seeking a presumption against 
contact in circumstances of domestic violence, and by fathers’ groups pressing for a 
presumption of equal shared care.   
 
25 years later legislation is to enshrine for the first time the requirement that ‘[a] 
court…is…to presume, unless the contrary is shown, that involvement of [a] parent in 
the life of the child concerned will further the child’s welfare.’2  This article considers 
why, despite the prevalence of domestic violence in private law proceedings, refusals 
of applications for contact are so rare, and what the implications are of the 
presumption of parental involvement for child arrangements proceedings where 
allegations of domestic violence are made.3 It focuses in particular on judicial and 
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1 Ministry of Justice, Judicial and Court Statistics 2011 (Ministry of Justice, 2012) 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/217494/judicial-court-
stats-2011.pdf (last accessed 2 November 2013) – less than 0.3 percent of applications for contact were 
refused in 2011. 
2 Children Act 1989, s 1(2A), implemented by Children and Families Act 2014, s 1, in force 22 April 
2014 
3 The term ‘child arrangements order’ replaced ‘residence’ and ‘contact’ orders from 22 April 2014 – 
Children and Families Act 2014, s 12 
2 
 
professional perceptions of domestic violence and of children’s welfare on parental 
separation, and how these perceptions inform judicial decision-making and 
professional practices in private law Children Act proceedings. In doing so, this 
article draws on the author’s small-scale qualitative study of the perceptions and 
practices of courts and professionals in contact proceedings where domestic violence 
is an issue, with particular reference to Practice Direction 12J (‘the Practice 
Direction’), which stipulates best practice in cases concerning residence and contact 
orders where allegations of domestic violence are made.4  
 
BACKGROUND TO THE PRACTICE DIRECTION (A) 
While domestic violence is prevalent in the general population, it is even higher in 
families with children.5  It is recognised that domestic violence is not perpetrated 
exclusively by male partners. However, research and statistics attest to the gendered 
prevalence, frequency and severity of domestic violence.6 It is also clear that the vast 
majority of applications for contact are made by fathers.7 ‘This reflects that women 
are significantly more likely to be resident parents and that victim-survivors of 
domestic violence are disproportionately likely to be women and perpetrators men.’8 
 
These data strongly suggest that a large proportion of child contact arrangements take 
place within a context of domestic violence. A parliamentary inquiry into domestic 
violence reported that: ‘Up to 50% to 60% of Cafcass’s caseload is domestic violence, 
                                                 
4 A Practice Direction is a supplemental protocol to rules of procedure. They are issued by the 
President of the Family Division when applicable to family law cases. 
5 S Walby and J Allen, Domestic violence, sexual assault and stalking: Findings from the British Crime 
Survey (Home Office Research Unit Study 276, 2004); Home Office, British Crime Survey (Home 
Office, 2010); A Mullender, Tackling Domestic Violence: providing support for children who have 
witnessed domestic violence (Home Office, 2004); J Bossy and S Coleman, A Research and Literature 
Review: Protection and Accountability (HMCPSI, 2004) 
6 S Walby and J Allen, Domestic violence, sexual assault and stalking: Findings from the British Crime 
Survey (Home Office Research Unit Study 276, 2004);C Smart, V May, A Wade and C Furniss, 
Residence and Contact Disputes in Court Volume 2 (DCA Research Series 4/05, 2005); M Hester, Who 
does what to whom? Gender and domestic violence perpetrators (University of Bristol, 2009); Crown 
Prosecution Service, Violence Against Women and Girls: Crime Report 2011-2012 (CPS, 2012); Office 
for National Statistics, Focus on: Violent Crime and Sexual Offences 2011/2012 (ONS Statistical 
Bulletin, 2013) 
7 C Humphreys and C Harrison, ‘Squaring the Circle – Contact and Domestic Violence’ (2003) 33 Fam 
Law 419-423; R Aris and C Harrison, Domestic violence and the supplemental information form 
(Ministry of Justice, 2007);  D Cassidy and S Davey, Family Justice Children’s Proceedings – Review 
of Public and Private law Case Files in England & Wales (Ministry of Justice, 2011) 
8 M Coy, K Perks, E Scott and R Tweedale, Picking up the pieces: domestic violence and child contact 
(Rights of Women, 2012) at p 33. Respondents to the author’s study spoke almost exclusively in terms 




and those figures increase every year as domestic violence is better identified.’9 Her 
Majesty’s Inspectorate of Court Administration (‘HMICA’) estimated the proportion 
of Cafcass’s cases in which domestic violence is an issue to be up to 70 per cent or 
more and observed that, anecdotally, ‘CAFCASS practitioners place the incidence of 
domestic violence in the region of 90% or more of cases they deal with’.10  
 
Despite the prevalence of domestic violence and its well-documented effects on 
victims and children, legal and professional discourses virtually ignored the issue of 
domestic violence in the arena of child contact and residence until relatively recently. 
The connection between the welfare of children on parental separation, and the 
perpetration of domestic violence by fathers was almost totally absent. Underlying 
this ideological divide was the perceived importance for children of maintaining 
contact with non-resident parents, which led to an increasing scrutiny of mothers 
involved in private law Children Act proceedings and a decreasing focus on the 
father’s conduct and parenting practices.11 This gave rise to dominant feminine and 
masculine subjectivities of ‘implacably hostile mothers’ and ‘safe family men’ which 
have had a powerful effect on legal decision-making and professional practice in the 
area of child contact.  Mothers’ fears and concerns may be reconstructed as obduracy 
and irrational or pathological self-interest because the dominant construction of 
children’s interests aligns them so closely with father-involvement.12   
 
It is not surprising, therefore, that courts and professionals often minimised domestic 
violence and efforts were focused on persuading mothers to cooperate, rather than on the 
father’s behaviour or on women’s and children’s safety. Most professionals did not 
consider domestic violence relevant to current contact, and were unwilling to support the 
                                                 
9 Newsline Extra, ‘Domestic Violence Commons Inquiry’ 38 (2008) Fam Law 269-271 at p 270 
10 HMICA, Domestic Violence, Safety and Family Proceedings (HMICA, 2005) at p 17.  
11 See F Kaganas and S Day Sclater, ‘Contact Disputes: Narrative Constructions of “Good” Parents’ 
(2004) 12 Feminist Legal Studies 1-27; V Elizabeth, N Gavey and J Tolmie, ‘Between a Rock and a 
Hard Place: Resident Mothers and the Moral Dilemmas they Face During Custody Disputes’ (2010) 18 
Feminist Legal Studies 253-274 
12 H Rhoades, ‘The “No Contact Mother”: Reconstructions of Motherhood in the Era of the “New 
Father”’ (2002) 16 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 71-94; S Boyd, ‘Demonizing 
Mothers: Fathers’ Rights Discourses in Child Custody Law Reform Processes’ (2004) 6(1) Journal of 
the Association for Research on Mothering 52-74; V Elizabeth, N Gavey and J Tolmie, ‘Between a 
Rock and a Hard Place: Resident Mothers and the Moral Dilemmas they Face During Custody 
Disputes’ (2010) 18 Feminist Legal Studies 253-274 
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mother in stopping contact. 13  These practices persisted even after the Children Act Sub-
Committee of the Lord Chancellor’s Advisory Board on Family Law (‘the CASC’)14  
and the Court of Appeal in Re L, V, M, H (Contact: Domestic Violence)15 (‘Re L’) laid 
down ‘good practice’ guidelines for the approach to be taken when domestic violence is 
put forward as a reason for denying or limiting parental contact.  
 
The post-Re L case law and research revealed that the application of the guidelines was 
inconsistent and ‘patchy’ and that they were frequently ignored.16 Courts continued to 
minimise and ‘neutralise’ domestic violence, even in cases of extremely severe physical 
violence, and to focus instead on promoting contact.17 Fact-finding hearings were rarely 
held, and the promotion of post-separation contact continued to lead to women being 
pressurised into agreeing to unsafe contact arrangements and courts being reluctant to 
restrict contact. Research initiated by the Family Justice Council (‘FJC’) in 2006 found 
that, in general, the Re L guidelines were more honoured in the breach than the 
observance and that in applications for consent orders the Re L guidelines were virtually 
ignored.18 As a consequence, the numbers of contact applications refused by courts prior 
to the Practice Direction being issued steadily decreased,19 and direct contact was the 
expected outcome in the vast majority of cases.20   
 
                                                 
13  M Hester and R Radford, Domestic Violence and Child Contact Arrangements in England and 
Denmark (The Policy Press, 1996); M Hester, C Pearson and L Radford, Domestic Violence: A 
National Survey of Child Welfare and Voluntary Sector Mediation Practice (The Policy Press, 1997);  
C Humphreys, ‘Judicial alienation syndrome – failures to respond to post-separation violence’ (1999) 
29 Fam Law 313-316. See, eg, Re H (A Minor) (Contact) [1994] 2 FLR 776;  Re M (A Minor) (Contact: 
Conditions) [1994] 1 FLR 272; Re O (Contact: Imposition of Conditions) [1995] 2 FLR 124; Re P 
(Contact: Supervision) [1996] 2 FLR 314; D v N (Contact Order: Conditions) [1997] 2 FLR 797 
14 CASC, Guidelines for Good Practice on Parental Contact in cases where there is Domestic Violence 
(TSO, 2001) 
15 Re L, V, M, H (Contact: Domestic Violence) [2000] 4 All ER 609, [2000] 2 FLR 334 
16 DCA and DfES, The Government’s Response to the Children Act Sub-Committee (CASC) Report: 
Making Contact Work (DCA, DfES, 2004) 
17 HMICA, Domestic Violence, Safety and Family Proceedings (HMICA, 2005); A Perry and B Rainey, 
‘Supervised, Supported and Indirect Contact Orders: Research Findings’ (2007) 21 International 
Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 21-47; J Hunt and A Macleod, Outcomes of applications to 
court for contact orders after parental separation or divorce (Ministry of Justice, 2008) 
18 J Craig, ‘Everybody’s Business: Applications for Contact Orders by Consent’ (2007) 37 Fam Law 
26-30. 
19 In 2005, 1.15% of contact applications were refused – see DCA, ‘Judicial Statistics 2005 (Revised)’ 
(TSO 2006, Cm 6903); in 2006, 0.95% of contact applications were refused – see Secretary of State for 
Justice and Lord Chancellor, ‘Judicial and Court Statistics 2006’ (TSO 2007, Cm 7273);  
20 C Smart and V May, ‘Residence and Contact Disputes in Court’ (2004) 34 Fam Law 36; J Hunt and 
A Macleod, Outcomes of applications to court for contact orders after parental separation or divorce 
(Ministry of Justice, 2008); V Peacey and J Hunt, Problematic contact after separation and divorce? A 
national survey of parents (One Parent Families/Gingerbread, 2008) 
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The FJC called for a ‘cultural change…with a move away from “contact is always the 
appropriate way forward” to “contact that is safe and positive for the child is always the 
appropriate way forward”.’ 21  In order to promote this ‘cultural change’, Practice 
Direction 12J was issued by the President of the Family Division in May 2008. 
 
This account of the background to the Practice Direction demonstrates how the practices 
and perceptions of courts and professionals have been both shaped by, and have 
reinforced, the ideological separation of contact and domestic violence, driven by the 
pervasive assumption that post-separation contact invariably benefits children. The focus 
of this study, was whether the Practice Direction has led to any shift in professional and 
judicial perceptions and practices in private law Children Act proceedings where 
domestic violence is an issue.  
 
THE METHODOLOGY (A) 
In-depth semi-structured interviews were conducted with a total of 29 barristers, 
solicitors and Family Court Advisers employed by Cafcass (‘FCAs’) from five 
HMCTS regions, 22  covering a diverse geographical and demographic area. 23 
Additionally, all reported cases relevant to the operation of the Practice Direction 
from May 2008 to September 2013 were reviewed. The data from the interviews and 
case review were analysed thematically utilising discourse analytic and qualitative 
approaches.24  
 
The research findings relevant to the subject of this article will now be discussed. 
Reference will also be made to contemporaneous research by Maddy Coy, Katherine 
Perks, Emma Scott and Ruth Tweedale (‘Coy et al’)25 and Rosemary Hunter and 
Adrienne Barnett (‘Hunter and Barnett’).26 
                                                 
21  J Craig, ‘Everybody’s Business: Applications for Contact Orders by Consent’ (2007) 37 Fam Law 
26-30 at p 27 
22 The interview sample comprised 8 barristers, 10 solicitors and 11 FCAs. 
23 Most interviews were conducted in 2011; five were undertaken in 2010. 
24 Pseudonyms were used to preserve the anonymity of interview participants. 
25 M Coy, K Perks, E Scott and R Tweedale, Picking up the pieces: domestic violence and child contact 
(Rights of Women, 2012) 
http://www.rightsofwomen.org.uk/pdfs/Policy/Picking_Up_the_Pieces_Report_final.pdf (last accessed 
10 June 2014) 
26 R Hunter and A Barnett, Fact-Finding Hearings and the Implementation of the President’s Practice 
Direction: Residence and Contact Orders: Domestic Violence and Harm (Family Justice Council, 2013) 




THE FINDINGS (A) 
The ‘presumption of contact’ (B) 
The interviews and analysis of case law reveal that most professionals and judicial 
officers have continued to endorse the de facto ‘presumption of contact’ since the 
Practice Direction was issued. All but one interview participant considered that 
contact between children and non-resident parents is ‘very important’ or ‘extremely 
important’. There were no overt differences in views between family lawyers and 
FCAs in this respect. ‘On a scale of 1 to 10, I would say 10. With 10 being the 
exceptionally important, yes.’ [Ms H, FCA, SE] Nine respondents (most of whom 
were solicitors) indicated that post-separation contact is important, but only if it is 
safe, including emotionally safe. Only two participants (both FCAs) were of the view 
that contact is beneficial as long as it is of good quality.  
 
Professional and judicial assumptions about the benefits of contact between children 
and non-resident fathers have had a powerful effect on the way in which domestic 
violence is perceived and is seen as ‘relevant’ to contact. 
 
Perceptions of domestic violence (B) 
Most of the professionals interviewed recognised that domestic violence is not limited 
to incidents of physical violence [n = 21]. Many respondents described it as 
encompassing emotional abuse, and a few considered that financial control and 
denigration of the mother are forms of domestic violence. ‘You know, it isn’t always 
physical, it’s the emotional abuse and the erosion of self-esteem.’ [Ms G, Barrister, 
SE] Half of all respondents (but only two barristers) articulated a theoretical 
understanding of the power and control dynamics that characterise domestic violence, 
although more FCAs than family lawyers understood these dynamics. ‘And we need 
to be aware that that control doesn’t need to be the physical; the emotional, the mental 
control can be just as effective, but just as corrosive to the victim.’ [Mr J, FCA, NE] 
 
Many participants thought that their local judges have a good understanding of what 
constitutes domestic violence and ‘take it seriously’, and a few respondents observed 
that judges’ awareness of domestic violence has improved over the past few years. 
The more recent reported cases also suggest that more judges are starting to recognise 
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the coercively controlling nature of domestic violence, as well as the many ways in 
which that control can be exercised.27  
 
However, these perceptions do not necessarily translate into practice, since half of all 
interview participants still considered anything ‘less than physical’ not to be serious, 
important or ‘real’ violence. These professionals tended to minimise behaviours that 
did not constitute incidents of severe physical violence. Ms E referred to a case in 
which the violence was ‘mid-level’, comprising ‘punching, kicking, pushing her over, 
slashing the flat, that sort of thing, nothing where she really needed much help from 
the hospital other than painkillers. No stabbings, or anything nasty, again I hate to 
minimise it.’ [Ms E, Barrister, London]  
 
Eight respondents expressed concern that courts, too, tend to focus on incidents of 
physical violence and are not alive to, or take seriously, other forms of domestic abuse. 
‘I’d say that the majority look at physical violence or strongly threatening behaviour 
as domestic violence, rather than the smaller forms of abuse or intimidation…I’d say 
more the physical violence is the thing that’s focused on more.’ [Ms A3, Barrister, 
London] Similar findings were made by Coy et al.28 These perceptions are supported 
by the case law which also reflects a narrow construction of the importance and 
relevance of domestic violence.29 
 
When is domestic violence relevant to contact? (B) 
The reported cases and the interview responses strongly indicate that most courts and 
family lawyers perceive domestic violence to affect case outcomes and therefore to be 
relevant to contact when it involves recent incidents of very severe  physical 
violence.30 Domestic violence that is considered to be ‘minor’ or ‘petty’ and/or is 
designated as ‘old’ or ‘historical’ is not thought to be relevant to contact because 
courts and professionals fail to contextualise it within the gendered power and control 
                                                 
27 See Re W (Children: Domestic Violence) [2012] EWCA Civ 528,  [2014] 1 FLR 260; Re W 
(Children) [2012] EWCA Civ 1788; Re S (A Child) [2012] EWCA Civ 1031 
28 See in particular at p 60. 
29 See, eg, Re P (Children) [2008] EWCA Civ 1431; A v A (Appeal: Fact-finding) [2010] EWHC 1282 
(Fam); Re H (Contact Order) [2010] EWCA Civ 448, [2010] 2 FLR 866; Re R (Family Proceedings) 
[2009] EWCA Civ 1619, [2009] 2 FLR 82; Re J (A Child) [2012] EWCA Civ 720 
30 See, eg, Re E (Contact) [2009] EWCA Civ 1238, [2010] 1 FLR 1738; Re C (Domestic Violence: 
Fact-Finding Hearing) [2009] EWCA Civ 994, [2010] 1 FLR 1827. Similar findings were made by 
Coy et al and Hunter and Barnett. 
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dynamics of domestic violence. ‘Someone taking someone’s phone and not allowing 
them to have it and being very controlling over money and being verbally abusive 
which the child may not have been aware of which doesn’t necessarily mean that their 
contact shouldn’t happen.’ [Ms M, Barrister, SW]  
 
However, a minority of family lawyers and Cafcass officers expressed concern about 
the tendency of courts to consider ‘historical’ allegations of domestic violence as 
irrelevant to contact. Ms L gave an example of a case in which the father attempted to 
strangle the mother two years prior to the relationship breakdown, and the mother 
provided an account of a history of ‘sort of intimidating and controlling 
behaviour…He was doing things like filming her at handovers…stuff that rings alarm 
bells…and the judge said that he felt that the violence that the mother had alleged was 
historical and even if found as proven would not affect the progression of contact.’ 
[Ms L, Solicitor, SW] Because this judge perceived domestic violence in a legalistic 
way as comprising discrete incidents, the father’s controlling behaviours were 
discounted by him, as was the only violence he considered to be ‘real’ violence 
because it was, historical.  
 
So we can see a bifurcated approach: while more judges and professionals are 
developing their understanding of domestic violence and taking it more seriously, the 
ambit of when and how it is relevant to contact has grown increasingly narrow. This 
means that, for most courts and family lawyers, and some Cafcass officers, there is an 
‘acceptable’ level of abuse that mothers should be prepared to tolerate for the sake of 
their children. This bifurcated approach permeates every aspect of contact 
proceedings, including the practices of professionals in negotiating agreements for 
contact and of judicial officers in approving them. It therefore goes a long way 
towards explaining why refusals of contact orders, already rare, have decreased to 
miniscule levels since the Practice Direction was implemented.  
 
Seeking agreement – advice or coercion? (B) 
A major concern of the Family Justice Council, which led to the Practice Direction 
being issued, was the extent to which unsafe consent orders were being negotiated by 
professionals and sanctioned by the courts, often as a consequence of pressure being 
put on mothers to compromise and/or agree to contact. This practice arises out of the 
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assumption that not only do children ‘need’ to maintain a relationship with non-
resident parents, but also that ‘conflict’ and litigation are harmful so it is better for 
children for their parents to cooperate and agree that contact should happen rather 
than ‘battle it out’ in court proceedings. 
 
The majority of family lawyers interviewed firmly signed up to the notion that 
agreements between parents for contact benefit children rather than decisions by 
courts [n = 12], and that the courts expect such agreements to involve some form of 
contact. It was not, therefore, surprising to find that most family lawyers advised their 
clients that contact is ‘the norm’ and that the courts generally expect children to have 
contact with non-resident parents, unless there are ‘exceptional’, ‘compelling’ or 
‘good’ reasons against it [n = 13]. 
 
‘I think that our local courts are very much of the view that contact should take 
place if at all possible…there will be an expectation that it should happen in 
some way or shape or form, be it direct, indirect, supervised, supported, and so 
on and so forth. And that there has to be exceptionally compelling reasons for 
the court to not order any contact.’ [Ms G, Barrister, SE]31 
 
Some lawyers went further and were more openly coercive, using various strategies to 
push mothers into agreeing to contact. ‘I usually ask them directly because normally 
we have instructions and then you go through what the court expects and often you 
can turn them round in ten or 15 minutes. That they will lose, on the facts.’ [Ms F, 
Barrister, SE] 
 
However, a number of respondents qualified their responses by saying that 
agreements can be beneficial as long as there are no risks involved, or the agreements 
are not ‘forced’ or the result of a power differential, and six lawyers indicated that 
they would advise clients on the courts’ preference for contact ‘as long as it is safe’.   
 
A minority of family lawyers [n = 4] and FCAs [n = 3] articulated an awareness of, 
and concern about the pressure that can be put on resident mothers to compromise, 
                                                 
31 The advice given to mothers by Ms G is typical of that expressed by most family lawyers. 
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often at the cost of their own and the children’s safety. ‘I mean, I think they 
sometimes feel to a degree that they have been coerced into agreeing because there’s 
been a fair degree of pressure from either the court or Cafcass or even their own legal 
advisers.’ [Ms T, Barrister, NW] 
 
Ms Y expressed concern about the court’s role in driving agreements for contact: 
 
‘The equal worry is that quite often resident parents will allow contact and agree 
contact arrangements because the pressure is very much on them to do that 
when it isn’t safe…I mean it feels to me like the impetus is very much from the 
judge that if there is a sniff of an agreement between parents that they will want 
to go for that.’ [Ms Y, FCA, London] 
 
Two barristers and an FCA expressed particular concern at the pressures that can be 
put on mothers who may be victims of domestic abuse and subject to coercive control. 
Ms P [Barrister, SW] and Ms C [Solicitor, SE] recognised that victims of domestic 
abuse are more likely to agree to contact as part of a pattern of attempting to appease 
controlling perpetrators, and Ms P expressed an awareness of the need to avoid 
replicating the perpetrator’s behaviour.  
 
‘In one case I had a mini-pupil with me and I said: “I have a view about where 
this case should go, have a view about this father and how controlling he is, but 
I also have to be careful as her professional adviser not to take the father’s place 
in that relationship because I didn’t want her to feel that I was putting pressure 
on her not, you know, to appease me”…I think it can be quite abusive, the 
relationship that we sort of have with our clients.’ [Ms P, Barrister, SW] 
 
Ms P felt, however, that most other family lawyers do not share her insight in this 
respect. ‘And they’re quite bombastic and actually all they’re doing is taking the place 
of the perpetrator and they put pressure on them.’  
 
While three Cafcass officers thought that family lawyers representing victims/mothers 
do attempt to protect their clients’ interests and focus on their safety, two others felt 
that family lawyers do not do so, and can push her, or allow her to enter into, unsafe 
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agreements for contact. Ms Y gave an example of a case where she considered that 
the mother’s representatives were behaving like the mother in failing to stand up to 
the father. ‘And I don’t know what the lawyers were doing but they kept getting to 
court and trying to set up agreements, and mum’s lawyers were just not standing up to 
dad’s lawyers and, you know…they behaved as she did.’ [Ms Y, FCA, London] Ms Y 
thought it was ‘wonderful’ when lawyers do stand up for the mother. ‘And I think 
there’s still a pressure on them, always a pressure on them to give contact even with 
domestic violence. It’s kind of, again, refreshing when a representative kind of puts 
forward no direct contact.’  
 
The way in which family lawyers may steer mothers towards agreements for contact 
is illustrated by the advice they give about interim contact pending fact-finding 
hearings. Most participants indicated that whether courts order interim direct contact 
depends on the particular judge and/or the circumstances of the case, and primarily 
whether or not contact is taking place at the time of the proceedings. At least eight 
participants indicated, however, that the mother will have to be particularly adamant 
and steadfast in her opposition to contact to persuade courts not to order direct contact. 
Only three solicitors and one barrister out of 18 family lawyers were clear that they 
would not try to persuade mothers who allege violence to agree to interim direct 
contact if they opposed it. Of the remaining 14 lawyers, six would advise their client 
to agree to contact (including those family lawyers who had been adamant that they 
would never persuade a victim of domestic violence to agree to contact), and eight 
indicated that their advice would depend on the circumstances. Family lawyers 
indicated that they would use various means of persuasion ranging from ‘advice’ on 
the approach the courts would take, to ‘encouragement’, to more explicit coercion, 
and would only support the mother in opposing contact if she is ‘resolute’ or 
‘adamant’.  
 
‘Well, you’ve got to take their concerns seriously. I think you’ve got to make it 
clear to them that some level of contact should take place and, you know, we 
have to meet their concerns but also the needs of the child and the rights of the 
other parent to see the child. We certainly wouldn’t be here saying: no, no, no, 
no, there should be no contact at all. That would go against Resolution guidance 
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and everything else that we have. You’ve got to be constructive about it, and 
realistic.’ [Mr R, Solicitor, NE]  
 
It was surprising to hear from Ms P, who had explained forcefully how careful 
representatives must be not to put pressure on mothers or replicate the perpetrator’s 
behaviour, that although she felt that in the interim situation, ‘the ball is in the 
mother’s court’, she would not tell her this but would advise her to agree to some 
contact to appear ‘reasonable’, although contact needs to be safe: ‘As I said to my 
lady this morning, that at the final hearing you want them to be the sort of picture of 
reasonableness so, you know, it’s a fine balance for your client, about making sure if 
they want contact to take place…then knowing that the court will want contact to take 
place and it will take a dim view of contact not taking place.’ [Ms P, Barrister, SW]  
 
Judicial scrutiny of consent orders (B) 
If it is the case that resident mothers, including those who have sustained domestic 
violence, may experience varying degrees of compulsion to agree to contact, it is all 
the more important that judges properly scrutinise proposed consent orders, as 
required by the Practice Direction. 
 
According to just over half of the respondents, the extent to which judicial officers 
scrutinise proposed consent orders depends entirely on the particular judge and/or the 
size of the court lists. Whereas some judges do enquire about domestic violence or 
ask for more information about it, others are happy simply to ‘sign off’ the order. A 
sizeable minority of respondents across the professional groups considered that a 
great deal of ‘rubber-stamping’ of consent orders still happens [n = 8].  
 
‘No, I think they’re quite happy to sit back and let us do all of that and the 
negotiations and reach the agreements and there’s a lot of rubber-stamping goes 
on, yeah…I can’t say that I’ve had a case where a judge has raised a concern 
about a consent order if the parties have agreed it, even where the court is aware 
that there’s a history of violence.’ [Ms L, Solicitor SW]32    
 
                                                 
32 Similar findings were made by Hunter and Barnett. 
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Five Cafcass officers expressed concern that courts may approve consent orders 
where they had already raised concerns about domestic violence, which may occur 
when the FCA is not present in court, or is involved in other cases. Mr J reported that 
in one of the courts in which he practises, the judges either fail to seek his views on 
consent orders or ignore them: ‘Oh, we don’t need to know that, Mr J, no, no, we’re 
not having that. These are two perfectly good people, this is all bureaucracy.’ [Mr J, 
FCA, NE] 
 
On the other hand, two FCAs provided examples of cases where they had voiced 
strong concerns about agreements for contact being made, which did have an effect on 
the outcomes. Ms Y [FCA, London] gave an example of an extremely worrying case 
where the mother, who spoke no English and was clearly very distressed, had two 
male lawyers with her, one of whom was interpreting. Ms Y was concerned that the 
lawyer was not giving a true account of what the mother was saying and it was only 
when she got one of the Cafcass staff to interpret that ‘the full story’ of a ‘really 
scary’ father emerged and Ms Y was able to ‘unpick’ the consent order. 
 
Ms N gave an example of a recent case: 
 
‘I’ve run into court in the end because they were just about, they said: “it’s been 
agreed”. I said: “there’s issues of horrendous domestic violence here that 
haven’t been looked at and I’m recommending full welfare reports”…I said: 
“I’m here for the child’s voice, so if I’m saying in my experience that there 
were safeguarding issues, we don’t know why this agreement has been 
reached”.’ [Ms N, FCA, SW] 
 
In this case, the mother had not voluntarily agreed to contact. ‘Her view was that she, 
um, wanted a quiet life, she didn’t want to make it difficult because if she makes 
things difficult he then becomes abusive…It drives me mad really. They must have 
known I wouldn’t agree to it…[but] they did listen.’  
 
It is clear from these accounts that Cafcass officers may need to be particularly 
‘robust’ and strong if they have concerns about agreements that have, or are about to 
be made. Ms Y and Ms N, who are extremely experienced FCAs, were able to 
14 
 
intervene effectively in the cases they described, but there must be concern that less 
experienced or more timid Cafcass officers may not be able to withstand the pressure 
from all sides for agreements to be reached and approved. 
 
Fact-finding hearings (B) 
If the mother has managed to resist advice, encouragement or pressure to reach 
agreement and the father disputes allegations of domestic violence, the court will need 
to consider whether to hold a fact-finding hearing. This decision has important 
implications for whether or not domestic violence is taken into account when 
recommendations and decisions are made about contact.  
 
Most respondents, including all ten FCAs interviewed, and eight solicitors, but only 
two barristers, considered that fact-finding hearings were generally ‘helpful’ or 
‘useful’, to ‘narrow the issues’ or ‘resolve’ matters. Six family lawyers held mixed 
views on fact-finding hearings, and only two barristers and a solicitor held entirely 
negative views of them. The main negative aspects of fact-finding hearings were 
reported to be that they cause delay, they polarise the parties and increase acrimony 
between them, they use up scarce resources, and they do not or will not affect the 
outcome of the case, since contact is likely to be ordered in any event.33  
 
‘Nine times out of ten, even more than that, they are a complete and utter waste 
of time and energy for the parties, the court, for everyone, they just raise the 
temperature unnecessarily, because you have a winner and a loser, and that’s 
not what we’re meant to be doing in family law.’ [Ms G, Barrister, SE] 
 
For family lawyers who hold these views, fact-finding hearings are an unnecessary 
and harmful impediment to the ultimate goal of achieving contact and the harmonious 
post-separation family. This reinforces the perception that domestic violence is an 
unimportant obstacle to the really important business of promoting contact.  
 
The majority of family lawyers indicated that they would request a fact-finding 
hearing on behalf of the alleged victim (including some of those who held negative 
                                                 
33 For similar findings see Hunter and Barnett 
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views) [n = 12], and just over half of all respondents indicated that judicial officers 
are usually willing to hold fact-finding hearings if asked to do so [n = 15].34  However, 
the apparent willingness to request and hold fact-finding hearings masks the narrow 
circumstances in which they are likely to be requested and held. Most participants 
confirmed that fact-finding hearings are usually restricted to allegations considered 
‘relevant’ to contact, namely, those involving ‘incidents’ of recent, severe physical 
violence.35 The majority of family lawyers approved of this approach and some (those 
with predominantly negative views) thought they should be restricted even further.   
 
If preliminary fact-finding hearings are not held, the interviews and case law indicate 
that ‘composite’ hearings are rare, and that the approach of the lower courts in many 
cases is to ‘weed out’ and ignore allegations of domestic violence altogether if a 
separate fact-finding hearing is considered unnecessary. This suggests that many 
disputed allegations of domestic violence continue to be disregarded in the drive to 
encourage ‘contact at all costs’.  
 
Assessing risk and welfare – ‘safe family men’ and ‘hostile mothers’ (B) 
If the case does proceed to the stage where domestic violence is proved or admitted, 
the Practice Direction requires courts to assess and contextualise the risks involved of 
contact between children and perpetrators of domestic violence in order to determine 
not only whether contact can be ‘made safe’ but also whether it can be beneficial.36 
Most participants thought that courts do require the ‘risk’ of future contact to be 
assessed. However, responses were mixed on whether courts consider the broader 
factors set out in Paragraph 27 of the Practice Direction, with more family lawyers 
than FCAs reporting that courts do consider the Paragraph 27 factors ‘in some shape 
or form’ [Mr R, Solicitor, NE].  
 
The factor that respondents most frequently mentioned courts taking into account, 
which was also the key indicator of ‘risk’ for most participants, was whether the 
father accepted the findings made against him [n = 17]. Fathers who remain in denial 
after findings are made are generally seen by courts and professionals as ‘high risk’. 
                                                 
34 11 respondents indicated that there are wide differences amongst judges in this respect. 
35 Similar findings were made by Coy et al and Hunter and Barnett 
36 Paragraphs 26 and 27. These provisions, with slight amendments, are now contained in Paragraphs 
36 and 37 of the revised Practice Direction but the previous paragraph numbers are used in this article.  
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However, seven respondents indicated that acceptance of findings is rare and it would 
also seem that perpetrators tend to deny allegations in the first place, which suggests 
that most perpetrators of domestic violence are ‘high risk’;37 however, as discussed 
below, most ‘high risk’ perpetrators invariably end up with some form of direct 
contact.    
 
Respondents’ views were far more ambivalent and mixed on the question of the 
father’s motivation. Of those who commented on this issue, four thought that courts 
do consider whether or not the father is motivated by a genuine concern for the child, 
but an equal number felt that courts either fail to question the father’s motivation, or 
are reluctant to believe that he has ‘improper’ motives. Two family lawyers observed 
that it is very difficult to persuade courts that the father is ‘motivated by anything 
other than a desire to see the children’. [Ms T, Barrister, NW]  
 
‘But obviously they’re coming from the stance that it’s best for the child to see 
the parent. So if someone’s expressing genuine concern to see their child, um, 
then they might err on the side of believing that. [Interviewer: how do courts 
decide that somebody has a genuine desire to see their child?] They say they do 
in their statement.’ [Ms B, Solicitor, London] 
 
Judicial attitudes towards fathers could also be discerned from participants’ reports of 
judges readily accepting expressions of contrition at face value, expressing sympathy 
for violent fathers, and being reluctant to accept that fathers could be abusive towards 
children.  
 
‘And equally if they are admitting it then, you know, even if it’s just on the 
morning of the fact-finding hearing then sometimes judges will be much more 
                                                 
37 This was confirmed by Hunter and Barnett’s research and there is some support for this in the case 
law - see Re P (Children) [2008] EWCA Civ 1431, [2009] 1 FLR 1056; Re J (Costs of Fact-Finding 
Hearing) [2009] EWCA Civ 1350, [2010] 1 FLR 1893; Re S (A Child) [2012] EWCA Civ 617; Re W 
(Children) [2012] EWCA Civ 1788; Re S (A Child) [2012] EWCA Civ 1031; AB v BR and Children 
(Through their Children’s Guardian) [2013] EWHC 227 (Fam), [2014] 1 FLR 178; ML v KW and 





gung ho and sort of say: well, you know, fine, he’s admitted it, let’s look at a 
way of resolving this without an expert assessment.’ [Ms T, Barrister, NW] 
 
The case law demonstrates an inconsistent application of Paragraph 27 by the lower 
courts and by Cafcass officers. In some cases the Paragraph 27 factors appear to have 
been ignored because of the perceived importance of contact and the downgrading of 
domestic violence, to the displeasure, on occasions, of the appellate courts.38  On the 
other hand, the cases suggest that some trial judges do have these factors in mind even 
if they are not expressly stated, and in those circumstances they are less likely to order 
direct contact where fathers have been unwilling to acknowledge their violent conduct 
or its impact on the mother and children.39 
 
Some professionals, too, expressed views generally more sympathetic to fathers than 
to mothers, particularly barristers, and demonstrated a reluctance to see fathers in a 
negative light. Most participants considered that fathers pursuing contact as a means 
of controlling or harassing the mother is more complex and less prevalent than 
mothers unjustifiably denying contact.  
 
Attitudes towards fathers contrasted with those demonstrated by professionals and 
judicial officers towards mothers. Although most participants did not see mothers as 
deliberately malicious and hostile to contact, images of ‘implacably hostile mothers’ 
continue to exert a powerful influence. All respondents viewed mothers as capable of 
obstructing contact for the ‘wrong’ reasons, and many demonstrated a wary attitude 
towards mothers, although fewer FCAs than family lawyers expressed overtly hostile 
attitudes towards mothers. A substantial minority of professionals (predominantly 
family lawyers) viewed allegations of domestic violence with suspicion or disbelief,40 
and some felt that mothers fabricate allegations for ulterior motives, most frequently 
as a delaying tactic and/or to disrupt the father’s relationship with the child.41   The 
case law demonstrates that judges, too, may view women’s complaints about 
domestic violence with suspicion, and that their concerns for their own safety, well-
                                                 
38 See, eg, Re W (Children) [2012] EWCA Civ 528, Re W (Children: Domestic Violence) [2014] 1 FLR 
260; Re W (Children) [2012] EWCA Civ 528 [15] Black LJ; Re S (A Child) [2012] EWCA Civ 617 
39 See Re E (Contact) [2009] EWCA Civ 1238, [2010] 1 FLR 1738; AB v BR and Children (Through 
their Children’s Guardian) [2013] EWHC 227 (Fam), [2014] 1 FLR 178. 
40 N = 11, comprising 8 family lawyers and 3 FCAs. 
41 Similar findings were made by Coy et al and Hunter and Barnett. 
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being and autonomy may be seen as expressions of self-interest.42 This is exacerbated 
by the way in which domestic violence disappears during the course of proceedings, 
so that the ‘problem’ of contact is laid at the door of the mother. 
 
Judicial and professional perceptions of the benefits of contact and the relevance of 
domestic violence to contact, together with attitudes towards parents involved in 
contact proceedings, have a powerful influence on the way in which family lawyers 
advise parents when domestic violence has occurred, and on the orders made by 
courts. 
 
Final orders (B) 
Many interview respondents indicated that, even where domestic violence is proved, 
this ‘hardly ever’ or ‘very rarely’ results in no direct contact. ‘More often than not, 
even when findings have been made, contact will eventually be ordered either as 
supported/supervised, and then eventually unsupported.’ [Ms E, Barrister, London] 
Indeed, Ms E had not encountered a case recently where the court ordered indirect 
contact only after a fact-finding hearing.43 These observations are supported by the 
reported cases, which demonstrate that despite findings of domestic violence being 
made, the lower courts may order direct contact against the wishes of the mother, or a 
less restrictive form of contact than that proposed or agreed to by the mother.44  The 
strong presumption in favour of contact has led to the higher courts encouraging 
mothers to shift their positions and allow contact with violent fathers, even in cases 
where it is recognised that direct contact is not appropriate at the time.45 The cases 
also reveal the unrelenting messages from the appellate courts about the importance of 
persevering with contact, even in cases of proven domestic violence, and the 
‘draconian’ nature of decisions to refuse direct contact.46 A similar reluctance to ‘give 
                                                 
42 See, eg, Re W (Children: Domestic Violence)  [2012] EWCA Civ 528; [2014] 1 FLR 260. Similar 
findings were made by Coy et al and Hunter and Barnett. 
43 Orders for contact were made in 81 percent of the cases of the women interviewed by Coy et al; there 
were no instances of ‘no contact’ orders. Similar findings were made by Hunter and Barnett. 
44 See, eg, Re A (Residence Order) [2009] EWCA Civ 1141, [2010] 1 FLR 1084; Re W (Children) 
[2012] EWCA Civ 528, [2014] 1 FLR 260 
45 See, eg, Re M (Children) [2009] EWCA Civ 1216, [2010] 1 FLR 1089, per Thorpe LJ at Para 12; Re 
A (Residence Order) [2009] EWCA Civ 1141, [2010] 1 FLR 1083 
46 See Re M (Children) [2009] EWCA Civ 1216, [2010] 1 FLR 1089; Re G (Restricting Contact) [2010] 
EWCA Civ 470, [2010] 2 FLR 692; Re K (Appeal: Contact) [2010] EWCA Civ 1365, [2011] 1 FLR 
1592; Re W (Direct Contact) [2012] EWCA Civ 999, [2013] 1 FLR 494; Re M (Children) [2013] 
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up on’ contact was also demonstrated by some of the participants in this study. The 
repeated judicial attempts to get contact established and progressing, often involving 
numerous hearings over months and years could be, but are not, constructed as 
‘wasteful’ of time and resources because the de facto presumption of contact has 
constituted them as ‘necessary’. 
 
The factors most commonly cited by the majority of family lawyers that would 
militate against the court ordering direct contact were the severity of the violence 
and/or how ‘historic’ it is, so that only recent, extremely serious physical violence 
would lead to no contact being ordered [n = 13]. Additionally, the perpetrator’s failure 
to admit the violence or accept the findings may persuade the court not to order any 
direct contact, although if the violence is not considered serious enough, such failure 
may not, in itself, be seen as a good enough reason.  
 
The examples provided by respondents suggest how extreme the circumstances have 
to be before courts will refuse direct contact.   
 
‘I had one case in xxx FPC at xxx where the…domestic violence was really at 
the most serious end I’ve ever seen. A broken jaw, two convictions for ABH, 
she was hospitalised whilst pregnant, in front of the children, you know, 
everything under the sun, and it was, um, obviously proved…but I completely 
expect dad not to get any direct contact…He denies all of them so his risk is 
obviously high…I think that’s the sort of case where…it becomes a no direct 
contact case.’ [Ms E, Barrister, London] 
 
The very low refusal rate of applications for contact may also be a consequence of the 
prevalence of agreements for contact, which may be attributable in part to the advice 
given to mothers. Most family lawyers indicated that even if domestic violence is 
proved they would advise the mother to agree to contact. 
 
‘I’ve had lots of cases which involve domestic violence and often the resident 
parent, or the victim, will deny contact because they’re concerned about that 
                                                                                                                                            
EWCA Civ 1147; Re M (Parental Responsibility Order) [2013] EWCA Civ 969, [2014] 1 FLR 339 per 
Ryder LJ at para 11 
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person’s behaviour. And it can be quite difficult to explain to them, the court 
always take a view that it’s in the child’s best interests to have a relationship 
with the other parent, but it has to be safe. I’ve not come across many cases 
where they have not ordered any contact, to be quite frank, save for a couple.’ 
[Ms C, Solicitor, SE] 
 
It is only in very extreme circumstances that family lawyers would support the mother 
in opposing direct contact: “I suppose if the domestic violence was so severe it’s been 
witnessed by the child, that child has been harmed emotionally and is at potential risk 
of serious harm in the future.” [Ms C, Solicitor, SE] More commonly, family lawyers 
use various strategies to persuade resident parents to agree to contact where domestic 
violence is proved or admitted, such as advising on the ‘presumption of contact’, 
emphasising the advantages to the client of maintaining some control over the 
outcome since the court will inevitably order contact and reassuring the mother that 
contact could be managed safely for her and the child. Most of these lawyers were not 
openly coercive in their advice. However, a few indicated that they would use more 
forceful strategies such as alluding to the court changing residence, or enforcement 
proceedings.  
 
Family lawyers’ reports of the advice they would give to mothers if domestic violence 
is proved were confirmed by their responses to a case scenario (‘the final case 
scenario’) in which the mother’s ‘serious’, but ‘historic’ allegations against the father 
were not found proved, the mother opposed all contact on the basis that she was 
frightened of the father and believed that he would never change, and the father did 
not accept the findings of domestic abuse made against him. The majority of 
respondents considered that the court in this case scenario would order some direct 
contact, if not immediately, but at some stage thereafter. It was not surprising, 
therefore, that most family lawyers said that they would advise the mother to agree to 
contact, primarily because they did not consider the findings made ‘serious enough’ to 
warrant the mother’s opposition [n = 13]. ‘I would tell her to get real, and start 
thinking positively, not for her sake but for the child’s sake because, from experience, 
this can backfire in later life and the child could turn on her and it has happened…and 
it is always a problem, that if this continues, this situation continues, then residence 




Although some family lawyers did point out that the court would be likely to take ‘a 
dim view’ of the father not accepting the findings, they would explain to the mother 
that this would be unlikely to prevent the court ordering contact, despite nearly all 
these family lawyers considering that fathers who do not accept findings made against 
them pose a high risk. 
 
The two family lawyers who had made it very clear, when speaking in general terms, 
that they would never advise or coerce a client to agree to contact where there is a 
history of domestic violence, both indicated that they would advise the mother in the 
final case scenario that the court would expect contact to take place and that she 
would therefore be better off agreeing to it. Only three family lawyers, all solicitors, 
indicated that they would not try to persuade the mother to agree to contact. These 
findings suggest that even ‘justified’ opposition to contact may be fruitless because of 
perceptions by family lawyers that any opposition is futile. 
 
Most FCAs expressed concern about courts ordering direct contact when domestic 
violence has occurred, yet the majority [n = 9] reported that courts do generally 
follow their recommendations in these circumstances. Since orders for no direct 
contact are so rare, these views suggest that it must be unusual for an FCA to 
recommend no direct contact, and that they, too, are reserving such recommendations 
for the most ‘serious’ cases. Some support for this proposition was provided by Ms I 
[FCA, NE], a very experienced Cafcass officer, who said that she had only twice ever 
recommended no contact at all between the child and non-resident parent. 
 
So it seems that the circumstances in which lawyers would support mothers in 
opposing contact, in which Cafcass officers would not recommend direct contact, and 
in which courts would not order it seem to be getting more limited and extreme, and 
the courts continue to be extremely  reluctant to ‘give up on’ contact. This means that 
the obligation of the ‘good mother’ can include putting up with very abusive 
behaviour and the possibility of no contact taking place has almost passed into the 
realms of the unimaginable. 
 
THE STATUTORY PRESUMPTION OF PARENTAL INVOLVEMENT’ (A) 
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As we have seen, the ‘benefits’ of contact have come to be treated as indisputable and 
unchallengeable ‘truth’, and ‘in the hands of the courts, this “truth” has become 
embedded in the law’.47 It is this ‘truth’ that underlies the statutory presumption of 
parental involvement being enshrined in the Children Act 1989. It is based on the 
assumption that the psychological and social science clinical findings, research and 
literature all support the proposition that children ‘need’ contact with non-resident 
fathers for their emotional, psychological and developmental health.  
 
In reality, however, behind the hegemonic status of this assumption lies a contingent, 
complex, contradictory and ambiguous body of research and theoretical literature that 
reveals no firm conclusions on how children’s welfare on parental separation can best 
be served.48 A large number of studies have found that the quality of contact is more 
important for children’s wellbeing than frequency.49 Some studies have found that 
even good quality contact is not likely to be the most significant factor affecting 
children’s overall welfare on parental separation, and that the quality and stability of a 
child’s care and relationship with the primary carer are factors of major influence.50 
What is also absent from legal/political constructions of children’s welfare are the 
negative aspects of contact, despite the existence of substantial literature on this 
issue.51  
                                                 
47 Felicity Kaganas and Shelley Day Sclater, ‘Contact Disputes: Narrative Constructions of “Good” 
Parents’ (2004) 12 Feminist Legal Studies 1-27, at pp 4-5 
48 See, eg, J Elliott, G Ochiltree, M Sinclair and F Tasker, ‘Divorce and Children: A British Challenge 
to the Wallerstein View’ (1990) 20 Fam Law 309-310;  PR Amato and B Keith, ‘Parental Divorce and 
the Well-being of Children: A Meta-analysis’ (1991) Psychological Bulletin 26-46; J Pryor and B 
Rogers, Children in Changing Families: Life after Parental Separation (Blackwell, 2001);  L Trinder, J 
Connolly, J Kellett, C Notley and L Swift, Making Contact Happen or Making Contact Work? The 
process and outcome of in-court conciliation (DCA Research Series 3/06, 2006) 
49 K Hewitt, ‘Divorce and Parental Disagreement’ (1996) 26 Fam Law 368-371; J Pryor and F 
Seymour, ‘Making decisions about children after parental separation’ (1996) 8(3) CFLQ 229-242; B 
Rogers and J Pryor, Divorce and Separation: The Outcomes for Children (Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation, 1998); J Lewis, ‘Fathering Practices in Twenty-Six Intact Families and the Implications 
for Child Contact’ (2005) 1 International Journal of Law in Context 81-99 
50 TL Thiriot and ET Buckner, ‘Multiple Predictors of Satisfactory Post-Divorce Adjustment of Single 
Custodial Parents  (1991) 17 Journal of Divorce and Remarriage 27-48; F Furstenberg and A Cherlin, 
Divided Families: What happens to children when parents part (Harvard University Press, 1991); L 
Burghes, Lone Parenthood and Family Disruption: the Outcomes for Children (Family Policy Studies 
Centre, 1994) 
51 See eg, C Sturge and D Glaser, ‘Contact and Domestic Violence – The Experts’ Court Report’ (2000) 
30 Fam Law 615-629; PR Amato, ‘Children of divorce in the 1990s: An update of the Amato and Keith 
(1991) meta analysis’ (2001) 15 Journal of Family Psychology 355-370; G Harold and M Murch, 
‘Inter-parental conflict and children’s adaptation to separation and divorce: theory, research and 
implications for family law, practice and policy’ (2005) 17(2) CFLQ 185-205; J Fortin, J Hunt and L 
Scanlan, Taking a longer view of contact: The Perspectives of young adults who experienced parental 




It should be made clear that it is not being asserted that the research and findings 
discussed above present a ‘correct’ or ‘truer’ picture of children’s welfare on parental 
separation, nor that the promotion of contact in individual cases is necessarily 
‘mistaken’. On the contrary, what is being explored is the contingent and provisional 
nature of the concept of ‘the welfare of the child’. It follows, therefore, that there may 
be numerous constructions, no final arbiter of which is ‘correct’, and many reasons 
why particular constructions arise and become dominant. However, by designating as 
a scientific ‘truth’ that continued contact between non-resident parents and children is 
necessarily in their best interests, legal discourse can disadvantage many children by 
marginalising and discrediting oppositional meanings about their welfare, and by 
trivialising and rendering irrational women’s reasons for opposing contact with non-
resident fathers.  
 
It may be thought unlikely that the new statutory presumption of parental involvement 
will have a significant impact on judicial and professional practice in proceedings for 
child arrangements orders, since the vast majority of courts and professionals already 
operate with a de facto presumption. However, the symbolic and material impact of 
the new provision should not be underestimated. Practice Direction 12J was recently 
revised to bring its provisions and terminology into line with recent amendments to 
the Children Act 1989 and with Practice Direction 12B - the Child Arrangements 
Programme (‘CAP’). The Private Law Working Group took the opportunity to replace 
its description of domestic violence with the current cross-government definition. It 
also implemented some of the recommendations of Hunter and Barnett’s study in 
order to improve risk assessment and protection for children and victim parents, and 
attempted to make the process more ‘user-friendly’ for litigants in person (‘LIPs’). 
However, we have seen that the strong belief of courts and professionals in the 
benefits of post-separation contact has already subverted attempts by policy-makers 
and judicial bodies to improve protection for resident parents and children in private 
law cases where allegations of domestic violence are made. There is a danger, 
therefore, that the new presumption will reinforce the existing pro-contact stance of 
courts and professionals and undercut the aims and operation of the revised Practice 
Direction. This may be exacerbated by the CAP’s emphasis on agreement-seeking and 
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diversion from the court process,52 and by the increasing number of litigants in person 
in family proceedings. 
 
Litigants in person (B) 
The effect of the presumption of parental involvement and the drive towards 
agreement may well be compounded by the surge in the numbers of litigants in person 
since the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (‘LASPO’) 
was implemented in April 2013. Current statistics indicate that over 50 percent of 
parties to private law proceedings are LIPs. 53  Furthermore, a recent Freedom of 
Information request by LawyerSupportedMediation.com revealed that the proportion 
of unrepresented mothers in private law children proceedings has increased by 64 
percent, an increase which is almost double the rate of unrepresented fathers.54 Many 
of these mothers are likely to be victims of domestic violence because of the stringent 
‘gateway’ requirements for evidencing domestic violence stipulated by LASPO. 
Research by Rights of Women and Women’s Aid in August 2013 found that in the 
first three months of the new legal aid rules, ‘50% of women affected by violence 
were ineligible for family law legal aid because they did not have the required 
evidence of domestic violence. Private law practitioners’ casework experiences 
reported to the FJC echo these findings.’55 
 
The effect of the large numbers of LIPs on the court process and on judicial and 
professional practice cannot be overestimated. The numerous written responses to the 
recent Commons Justice Select Committee’s enquiry into the effect of LASPO attest 
to the problems now encountered by courts. Cases are demanding considerably more 
time and resources from the courts as there are more contested cases, cases and 
hearings are taking longer and are less likely to reach agreement and settle, and 
‘unmeritorious’ applications are being made which would have been filtered out by 
                                                 
52 There is not the space in this article to do justice to the many innovative provisions of the revised 
Practice Direction, nor the terms of the CAP, which will be explored elsewhere. 
53 This is revealed by Ministry of Justice statistics and the numerous responses to the recent enquiry 
into the effect of LASPO - http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-
select/justice-committee/inquiries/parliament-2010/laspo/?type=Written (last accessed 2 June 2014). 
All responses to the LASPO enquiry may be accessed at this link.    
54 Family Law Week, ‘Unrepresented mothers in private law children proceedings increase by over 
60%’ (Law Week Limited, June 2014)  http://www.familylawweek.co.uk/site.aspx?i=ed130563 (last 
accessed 30 June 2014). See also http://www.familylawweek.co.uk/site.aspx?i=ed131047  
55 Written evidence to the LASPO enquiry from the Family Justice Council at p 7 
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lawyers.56 Additionally, without lawyers to prepare documentation and ‘translate’ the 
problems that parents bring to the courts in ways that ‘make sense’ to law, judges and 
FCAs are spending a considerable amount of time trying to work out what the ‘real’ 
issues are. ‘Generally, I encounter difficulties every day in the courts I attend with 
litigants in person not knowing how to go about things, not being willing to negotiate, 
not understanding the issues or being able to “narrow them down” and generally 
demanding their day in court. The Judges are worn to shreds dealing with them, as are 
we!’57    
 
The presumption of parental involvement may constitute a functional and ideological 
vehicle for courts and professionals to manage the difficulties posed by the large 
increase in LIPs, which could have a significant effect on the ability of women who 
have sustained domestic violence to obtain protection and autonomy from violent 
fathers. It may also reinforce current perceptions of the relevance of domestic 
violence to parental ‘involvement’. 
 
Perceptions of domestic violence and its relevance to child arrangements (B) 
Paragraph 3 of the revised Practice Direction explains that ‘domestic violence’ 
‘includes any incident or pattern of incidents of controlling, coercive or threatening 
behaviour, violence or abuse…[which] can encompass, but is not limited to, 
psychological, physical, sexual, financial or emotional abuse.’ It is too early to assess 
whether the revised definition will, on its own, raise judicial and professional 
understanding of the dynamics of domestic violence. There is a danger, however, that 
the presumption of parental involvement will reinforce existing perceptions of many 
courts and professionals that controlling or coercive behaviours are less serious or 
important than severe physical violence, and restrict even further the circumstances in 
which abuse is considered ‘relevant’ to child arrangements. 
 
Furthermore, many women, particularly those acting in person, may have great 
difficulty even articulating and proving such abuse, let alone ‘disproving’ the 
                                                 
56 Research by Kim Williams in 2011 also found that family cases involving litigants in person took 
longer, particularly where both parties were unrepresented – see K Williams, Research Summary 2/11 
Litigants in person: a literature review (Ministry of Justice, 2011) 
57 Written evidence of the FLBA, a member’s account, at p 12. See also Ryder LJ in Re C (Due 
Process) [2013] EWCA Civ 1412, [2014] 1 FLR 1239 at para 40 
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presumption on the basis of it. Research by Rights of Women into the LASPO 
gateways for legal aid ‘highlighted the very significant challenges women faced in 
evidencing non-physical forms of violence; forms of violence including coercive 
control which are now included in the Cross-Government definition of domestic 
violence. As one respondent said “I have no evidence, it’s emotional and financial 
abuse. I can’t see a way to prove this”.’58 Numerous responses to the LASPO enquiry 
attest to these difficulties.  
 
These problems have important implications for the willingness of courts to hold fact-
finding hearings. Although courts have to consider what evidence is required in order 
to determine the existence of a pattern of coercive, controlling or threatening 
behaviour, violence or abuse,59 it is clear that professionals and LIPs are finding this a 
difficult and challenging task. The temptation to avoid getting to grips with this issue 
by ruling that such behaviour would not, in any event, overcome the presumption of 
parental involvement, may be overwhelming.  
 
A further problem is that courts may not become aware in the first place that domestic 
violence is an issue in a case. The recognised difficulties for victims in disclosing 
domestic violence are likely to be compounded where the mother is acting in person, 
so the court may not even be provided with the information to assess whether 
domestic violence, as now defined, is a feature of the case. 60  If courts and 
professionals are unaware of the existence or extent of domestic violence, no ‘good 
enough’ reasons may therefore be discerned to displace the presumption of parental 
involvement. Those victims of domestic violence who have difficulty articulating the 
abuse they have sustained may be at greater risk of being constructed as ‘hostile’ and 
therefore deserving of a prescriptive application of the presumption. 
 
Pressure to agree to ‘parental involvement’ 
The pressure on victims of domestic violence by courts and professionals to agree to 
contact may be compounded where the victim is acting in person. Many of the 
responses to the LASPO enquiry expressed grave concern that, following the reduced 
                                                 
58 Written Evidence from Rights of Women at para 11, emphasis in original 
59 Practice Direction 12J, para 18 
60 See Re C (Due Process) [2013] EWCA Civ 1412, [2014] 1 FLR 1239 
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availability of legal aid, there are fewer lawyers to advise ‘clients to be reasonable and 
to consider the effect of their behaviour on children…’.61  Those clients who need 
persuading to be ‘reasonable’ may include mothers who have sustained domestic 
violence that professionals do not consider to be ‘relevant’ to child arrangements. On 
this basis, it may be thought that fewer self-represented victims of domestic violence 
may find themselves steered into agreements.  
 
However, this is not necessarily the case. Coy et al pointed out that where women are 
not represented, ‘[p]ressure to reach speedy resolution may mean that women accede 
to arrangements which are not necessarily in their own or their children’s best 
interests.’62  The current difficulties for the courts in managing the increase in LIPs 
may result in greater pressure on both litigants in person and those who are 
represented to reach agreement or attend mediation as the only way in which courts 
are able to cope with the large numbers of LIPs. Without lawyers to rely on, judges 
may increasingly find themselves, willingly or not, drawn into that process, and there 
are indications that, even before the presumption of parental involvement, judges have 
been undertaking this task, with worrying consequences for victims and children.  
 
‘Some of my clients have had to attend injunction hearings alone due to LAA 
losing/not processing their applications or asking ridiculous questions. At 
hearings, Judges have gone ahead despite knowing problems with legal aid. In 
one of my cases, my client was pushed into agreeing contact and a contact order 
was made. If I had been there, this would not have happened as in the 
circumstances the order was completely inappropriate.’63 
 
Furthermore, there may well be increased pressure on mothers who are LIPs by 
representatives of fathers seeking child arrangements orders and by unrepresented 
fathers themselves. A number of responses to the LASPO enquiry pointed out that 
unrepresented victim/mothers may be intimidated, bullied and pressurised by fathers 
and/or their representatives. ‘Ex partner wanted more contact and applied for a 
                                                 
61 Written Evidence from the Legal Aid Practitioners Group. See also Written Evidence from 
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62 Coy et al at p 40. See also Hunter and Barnett at p 61. 
63 Written Evidence from the Legal Aid Practitioners Group, case study provided by practitioner. See 
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contact order. The caller has to attend a second hearing. At the first hearing he was 
aggressive and she is afraid to go to the second hearing. He is a barrister representing 
himself. The caller is finding it difficult to understand court processes.’64   
 
There is also the problem of McKenzie Friends who have their own ‘agendas’, as was 
pointed out by some responses to the LASPO enquiry. ‘We as a practice have had 
many encounters as [sic] McKenzie Friends with their own agenda, many of who [sic] 
have encouraged appalling behaviour and bullying of our clients.’65 The presumption 
of parental involvement may even be specifically employed as part of a wider strategy. 
McKenzie Friends listed by Families Need Fathers (‘FNF’), for example, subscribe to 
the FNF charter which stipulates, inter alia, that ‘[t]here should be a presumption of 
shared residence and this should be the starting point when parents separate’.66 
 
Whether it is used by courts, professionals, LIPs or McKenzie Friends, the new 
presumption may prove to be a powerful tool to compel mothers, represented and 
unrepresented, to agree to ‘parental involvement’. This was explicitly articulated by 
Baroness Butler-Sloss in an interview with FNF:  
 
‘The judges and magistrates will be given a greater degree of influence, because 
they will read out that this clause is actually intended to benefit the child from 
the involvement of both parents…So I think it gives a big tool to mediators, a 
tool to the welfare officer, if the child gets to a welfare officer, a tool to the 
judge and the magistrates, to beat the head of the custodial parent and say you 
can’t just take the child yourself. So the first important message for parents 
is…they can be knocked into shape, into accepting that both of them must play 
a part in the life of the child in the future. But the second important message is, 
that if for some reason one of the parents really shouldn’t see too much of the 
child, for whatever reason that may be, that also comes out of this Clause.’67 
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Mothers who are perceived as implacably hostile or who do not conform to victim 
stereotypes may be particularly susceptible to this coercive approach. So the 
presumption of parental involvement may work to constrain ‘obstructive’ mothers in a 
circular process – by reinforcing the perception that seeking to restrict parental 
involvement is unacceptable, and by justifying more forceful pressure on such 
‘difficult’ mothers. 
 
Diversion from the court process (B) 
Not only may victims of domestic violence be pressured into agreeing to child 
arrangements orders; they may also be diverted right out of the court process 
altogether. Even before the recent legal aid changes, Coy et al found that: ‘A 
significant proportion of solicitors and barristers…reported that parties were required 
to attend mediation despite domestic violence having been raised as an issue.’68 This 
is likely to increase under the CAP, which obliges courts to consider, at every stage of 
the proceedings, whether non-court dispute resolution is appropriate. 69  The 
presumption of parental involvement may have an important role to play in 
encouraging such ‘diversion’ and in enabling mediators to achieve agreements. 
Although many responses to the LASPO enquiry indicate that mediation and 
Mediation Information and Assessment Meeting (‘MIAM’) uptake has decreased 
since LASPO, it may well increase when the compulsory MIAM provisions are fully 
effective. This is extremely worrying, since current research suggests that screening 
for domestic violence by mediators during MIAMs may be inadequate and 
ineffective.70 Increasing numbers of mothers who have sustained domestic violence 
may therefore find themselves mediating in the shadow of the presumption of parental 
involvement. 
 
Interim and final orders (B) 
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With respect to interim child arrangements orders, the revised Practice Direction 
requires courts to consider, in addition to the risk of harm to the child and caring 
parent, whether contact will be beneficial for the child.71  If domestic violence is 
found to have occurred, it reiterates some of the provisions of its predecessor, 
including that the court should only make a child arrangements order if it is satisfied 
that the physical and emotional safety of the child and resident parent can be 
secured.72 Additionally, the court needs to be satisfied that the resident parent will not 
be subjected to further controlling or coercive behaviour by the other parent.73 The 
court also has to consider the broader factors set out in Paragraph 37 (formerly 
Paragraph 27) of the Practice Direction.  
 
However, the presumption of parental involvement puts the onus squarely on the 
caring parent to establish that parental involvement will not further the child’s welfare. 
Resident parents who have sustained domestic violence may therefore have to prove 
that both interim and final orders will be neither safe nor beneficial for the child and 
that they will be subjected to further controlling or coercive behaviour by the abuser.  
Within the discursive context of current family law, this may be an almost impossible 
burden to fulfil, particularly for mothers without legal representation.  
 
Room for optimism? (B) 
It is hoped that this account of the possible effect of the presumption of parental 
involvement is unduly pessimistic, and there are, of course, many other complex 
factors at play in the transformed world of family law. We have seen that where 
judges and professionals do understand the dynamics of domestic abuse and recognise 
the conjoined and contextual nature of domestic violence and parenting, they are able 
to see beyond images of ‘safe family men’, and the perceived importance of contact is 
less likely to take priority over the effects of the father’s conduct on the mother and 
child. The vastly reduced availability of legal aid in private law proceedings and the 
difficulties for victims of domestic violence in accessing it appear to have raised 
professional and judicial awareness of the dynamics of domestic violence and its 
consequences for victims and children. The large numbers of organisations and 
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professionals who responded to the LASPO enquiry with concerns about the ‘two-
year’ restriction for gateway evidence of domestic violence suggests an increased 
awareness by professionals and judicial officers of the relevance of ‘historic’ abuse. 
‘For victims of anything bar the most trivial abuse two years is not a long time, and 
they may have been the subject of ongoing controlling or coercive behaviour through 
contact arrangements in the meantime.’74  
 
Additionally, the increase in litigants in person may open up the space for an 
expanded role by Cafcass officers, many of whom, as we have seen, appear to have 
keener insights into the behaviours of perpetrators and more reservations than courts 
and family lawyers about the drive towards ‘parental involvement’. They will, 
however, need to be very firm and forthright to overcome the drive towards 
agreement and ‘diversion’. 
 
CONCLUSIONS (A) 
‘Many relationships have domestic violence in them but only a fraction of 
contact cases fail…When we look at how bloody awful some of our cases are 
and the experiences of the children, it’s remarkable how few cases no contact is 
ordered. It is remarkable given we deal with the toughest ten per cent of cases 
where relationships break down and there are children.’ [Mr J, FCA, NE] 
 
Underlying the rarity of refusals of applications for contact is the welfare of the child, 
a ‘civilising’ device75 that has been selectively constructed by and in family law at 
different times and in response to different social, political and cultural demands, and 
which currently works to place fathers at the centre of children’s well-being after 
parental separation. The gendered relations of power that construct, underpin and 
sustain law’s current construction of ‘the truth’ about children’s welfare constantly 
challenge and subvert attempts to focus professionals and courts on protecting 
children and women in private law Children Act proceedings. These relations of 
power give rise to a discursive and ideological terrain that downplays, trivialises and 
erases women’s concerns about continued contact with violent fathers and have a 
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powerful normative influence on professional and judicial perceptions and practices. 
The symbolic and functional power of the presumption of parental involvement may 
reduce even further the ability of victim/mothers to offer any opposition to father-
involvement in child arrangements proceedings by reinforcing ‘the deviant nature of 
failing to abide by [the norm] of the separated but continuing family’.76 
 
The very narrow circumstances in which domestic violence is seen as relevant to 
contact and the strong pro-contact stance of the vast majority of courts and 
professionals ‘suggests that the father’s role continues to be viewed as inalienable, 
even when there is known previous or continuing violence.’77  We have seen that the 
parameters of what constitutes the ‘safe family man’ are expanding to include 
increasingly abusive, ‘dangerous’ fathers, a process that may be exacerbated by the 
presumption of parental involvement. This means that mothers may experience 
greater difficulty resisting the impetus towards agreement, and those who are 
unrepresented may be increasingly compelled to negotiate with their abuser. 
 
The valorisation of fatherhood in political, popular and legal discourses, reinforced by 
the perceived benefits of contact, means that fatherhood continues to be seen as an 
essentially ‘safe’ domain and ‘there remains an enduring distinction in legal and 
[child welfare] thinking between violent men and good fathers’ which underlies the 
‘separation of men’s violence from their parenting capacity’.78 These discourses have 
so resonated with professionals that they rarely question or even consider the quality 
of parenting by fathers who are perpetrators of domestic violence. Indeed, 
professionals and courts may treat violent fathers with more latitude, sympathy and 
understanding than the mothers who have been subjected to abuse. Very few family 
lawyers or judges consider ‘the role of a domestic violence perpetrator as a parent and 
have focused on a father’s emotional investment in caring about his children while 
overlooking his ability to care for them’.79 This means that even fathers with proven 
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histories of violence are seen as important for their children’s welfare, an importance 
that is now almost cast in stone by the presumption of parental involvement. 
 
We need to acknowledge that constructing non-resident fathers as ‘safe family men’ 
may contribute towards sustaining the image of law’s ‘ideal’ post-separation family 
but will not make perpetrators of domestic violence ‘safe’, which may be an 
unattainable goal. If we are to achieve the ‘cultural shift’ called for by the Family 
Justice Council, we need to acknowledge properly that ‘the family’ is not always a 
safe haven but a place where abuse can occur. In order to do so, we need to recognise 
that domestic violence is morally reprehensible and a ‘significant failure in 
parenting’, 80  and that women’s desires for safety, wellbeing and autonomy are 
morally legitimate. Until we are able to do so, many children may be put at risk by a 
prescriptive application of the presumption of parental involvement, courts will 
continue to clash with ‘implacably hostile mothers’, and contact between children and 
violent fathers will continue to be seen as positively desirable.  
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